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WHAT IS REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE
ADA? NOT AN EASY ANSWER; RATHER A
PLETHORA OF QUESTIONS.
John E. Matejkovic* & Margaret E. Matejkovic**
I. INTRODUCTION
In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),
Congress made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in most aspects
of employment against any "otherwise qualified" individual with a disabil-
ity. Since being signed into law by President George H. W. Bush, the ADA
has raised a number of issues, some discussed in more detail infra. One of
the more problematic issues under the ADA is the requirement that em-
ployers provide a reasonable accommodation to the disabled applicant/em-
ployee, where that accommodation allows the otherwise-qualified
applicant/employee to perform the job. In other words, the requirement of
reasonable accommodation relates to the removal of barriers in the work-
place of the disabled. Workplace barriers may include those of a tangible,
physical nature (e.g., an area or task that is physically unattainable to an
employee or applicant) or they may be more intangible in nature (e.g., a
personnel policy or practice).
While the reasonable accommodation requirement may appear on its
face to be relatively straight-forward, in practice the requirement is often
difficult. For instance, what is a reasonable accommodation? When does
the requirement arise? Who makes the request that triggers the require-
ment, and how is that request made? Most importantly, what is or is not
reasonable?
Despite the facial simplicity of the reasonable accommodation require-
ment, as a practical matter, more questions may be raised than can be eas-
ily answered. This article is not intended to be an all-encompassing
exploration of the issue of reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
Rather, this Article is offered as a review of law which supports the pro-
position that for every answer provided in response to a question of rea-
sonable accommodations, a plethora of other questions is presented.
Further, in light of the recent signing of the ADA Amendments Act
("ADAAA"), the authors submit that the questions and issues presented
herein are of even greater significance, especially considering that the
ADAAA has substantially broadened the ADA.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, The University of
Akron.
** Assistant Dean, The University of Akron School of Law
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II. OVERVIEW
In its enactment of the ADA, Congress recognized that 43 million
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities and further
suggested that this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older.' Estimates suggest that "more than 70% of those with se-
vere disabilities are not working, even though many of them are willing and
able to do so."12
Congress has declared that "historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities" and that such discrimination
continues to be a social and economic problem. Furthermore, Congress
has recognized that "individuals who have experienced discrimination on
the basis of disability often have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination," and the "continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity
to compete on an equal basis."'
In Fiscal Year ("FY") 2007 alone, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("the EEOC" or "the Commission") received a total of 17,734
charges of discrimination on the basis of disability,s which represents
21.4% of all charges filed with the Commission during that year.6 This to-
tal also represents a 14% increase from the total number of charges
presented in 2006 and is at its highest level in ten years (i.e., since 1998).
EEOC resolved 15,708 disability discrimination charges in FY 2007 and
recovered $54.4 million in monetary benefits for charging parties and other
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2006). The ADA covers employers engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce that has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(e) (2008).
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Primer for Small Business, 2004, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/adahandbook.html [hereinafter A
Primer for Small Business].
3. Thad LeVar, Why an Employer Does Not Have to Answer for Preventing an Employee with a
Disability from Utilizing Corrective Measures: The Relationship between Mitigation and Reasonable Ac-
commodation, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 69, 70 (2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006)).
4. Id.
5. Individuals alleging disability or handicap discrimination also may file charges or complaints
of discrimination with state Fair Employment Practices ("FEP") agencies. Coverage requirements for
state FEP's vary and charge statistics from state FEP's are not included in the EEOC's statistics.
6. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans With Disabilities Act
of1990 Charges, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (last modified Apr. 24, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 Charges]. As receipts include all charges filed under the
ADA and those filed concurrently under other statutes (e.g., Title VII, ADEA), the sum of receipts for
all statutes will exceed total charges received. Further, leave provisions of the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA") are often other options available to an employee who believes that he or she has
been unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of disability or handicap (i.e., in connection with a
request for leave of absence). The FMLA leave provisions are completely distinct from the reasonable
accommodations provisions of the ADA. The FMLA does not modify or preempt the ADA. See 42
U.S.C. § 2651(a) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (1995). Provided the employee meets the appropriate
statutory definitions, an employer must provide an employee with leave pursuant to the ADA or
FMLA, whichever provides the employee with greater statutory rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (1995).
However, an employee may only use relief provided by one of the statutes. Id.; see also Laffey v. Nw.
Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (In consideration of the EPA and Title VII, an employee
cannot "reap overlapping relief for the same wrong").
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aggrieved individuals (not including monetary benefits obtained through
litigation).'
One commentator observed that some recent employment-related
ADA decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been interpreted
and applied between employees and employers with the preliminary deci-
sions in favor of plaintiff-employees while other Supreme Court decisions
involving claims by employees alleging ADA violations were not as
"favorable to those seeking the protection of the statute."' According to
surveys conducted by the American Bar Association, employers won 98%
of the ADA employment cases resolved in 2003 and nearly 95% in 2002.9
Notwithstanding this likelihood of success at trial, an employer's response
to a federal or state agency investigation may cost the employer between
$2,500 and $10,000.10 Actually litigating a case through trial can cost the
employer between $50,000 and $500,000.11 Additionally, in most cases, the
available damages are "a fraction of the costs of defense" . . . and "there is
always the possibility of losing at trial."12
The EEOC suggests that most accommodations are not expensive
when reporting that a median approximate cost of $240.00 and with one-
fifth of the accommodations costing nothing.13 The Commission reminds
employers, however, that regardless of cost, an employer does not need to
provide an accommodation that would pose undue hardship or other signif-
icant difficulty in terms of the operation of the employer's business, based
on the resources and operation of the business. 1 4
A. What is a covered disability?
Only individuals who have a qualifying disability "have standing to as-
sert a claim under the ADA.""s Title I of the ADA provides the general
rule prohibiting disability discrimination:
7. See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 Charges, supra note 6.
8. Ronald Turner, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Workplace: A Study of the Su-
preme Court's Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379, 385 (2004).
9. See American Bar Association at www.abanet.org. See also "Washington, D.C. Employment
Law Letter" (Vol. 4, Issue 4, September 2003).
10. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs
Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 at *18 (2003) (noting that such costs "depend[] ... on the complexity and
location of the case").
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See A Primer for Small Businesses, supra note 2.
14. Id.
15. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions, and Suggested Solutions after U. S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45
ARIz. L. REV. 931, 932 (2003). A detailed discussion of what constitutes a "disability" including "who
is a qualified individual" is beyond the scope of this article and is reserved for discussion in a future
article.
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No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.' 6
To successfully maintain a claim of violation of the ADA, the claimant
must prove that (1) he or she has a disability; (2) that he or she is otherwise
qualified for the job; and (3) that the employer either refused to make a
reasonable accommodation for his or her disability or made an adverse
employment decision regarding him or her solely because of his or her
disability."
With respect to an individual, the term "disability" means "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. §12112(b) (2006) (stating that unlawful dis-
crimination includes: "(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of
such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the
discrimination prohibited by this . . . [title] (such relationship includes a relationship with an employ-
ment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the
covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs); (3) utilizing stan-
dards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
disability; or (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control; (4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship
or association; (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the oper-
ation of the business of such covered entity; or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job appli-
cant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the
need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant; (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to
be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and (7) failing to
select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when
such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory,
manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other
factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are
the factors that the test purports to measure)").
17. Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Rizzo v. Children's World
Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d
1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995). In Roush, the plaintiff suffered from kidney and bladder conditions that
resulted in frequent absenteeism. The court considered the kidney and bladder issues separately find-
ing (1) the kidney condition did not amount to an ADA-covered disability as this impairment did not
presently substantially limit the major life activity of working and the fact that it may recur is not
sufficient to establish that the condition is substantially limiting; and (2) the bladder condition, includ-
ing bladder infections, may amount to a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. The
court remanded the second issue back to the district court (the district court only considered whether
her bladder infections constituted a disability). Id. at 843.
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activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being re-
garded as having such an impairment."" "Physical or mental impairment"
is defined to mean,
any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardio-
vascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or any mental or psychologi-
cal disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.19
"Major life activities" include functions "such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."20
The term "substantially limits" means that the "disabled individual is
unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the gen-
eral population can perform with little or no difficulty."2 1 Also, an individ-
ual may be "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which he or she can perform a particular major life activity as com-
pared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average per-
son in the general population can perform that same major life activity."2 2
In "determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity," the following factors should be considered: "the nature and
severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the im-
pairment; and the permanent or long term impact, or the expected perma-
nent or long term impact of or resulting
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2007).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007).
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from the impairment." 23  "Temporary, non-chronic impairments" with
no long-term impact are not generally considered to be substantially
limiting.24
Notwithstanding the EEOC's prior pronouncement that mitigating
measures should not be considered in the determination of whether an in-
dividual is substantially limited, the United States Supreme Court held oth-
erwise in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., in which two sisters who were
denied employment due to myopia, but who had 20/20 vision once cor-
rected were not disabled under the ADA.25 In Sutton, the Court reiterated
the tenet outlined in the above-referenced regulation that "'inability' to
perform a single, particular job .is not a substantial limitation upon
working.' "26
Accordingly, the EEOC currently recognizes that a person who exper-
iences no substantial limitation in any major life activity when using a miti-
gating measure may not meet the ADA's first definition of "disability" (i.e.,
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity).27
B. Who is a "qualified individual with a disability?"
"The term "'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the employment position that such individ-
ual holds or desires." 28  "Consideration [is] given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential [ ]."129 "If an employer
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2007). With respect to the major life activity of working, this section
of the regulations goes onto note that "the term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, partic-
ular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Id. This
section also outlines factors that may be "considered in determining whether an individual is substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of 'working' including the geographical area to which the individ-
ual has reasonable access; the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment
(class of jobs); and/or the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impair-
ment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abili-
ties, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes)." Id.
24. See, e.g., Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 520
U.S. 1116 (1997) ("Such impairments may include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints,
concussions, appendicitis, and influenza."); see also 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j) (2007) (temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not
disabilities).
25. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
26. Id. at 493 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2007)).
27. See, e.g., http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/blindness.html.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
29. Id.
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has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing appli-
cants for the job, this description is considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job."o3
C. What is the requirement of reasonable accommodation?
"As the U. S. Supreme Court has clarified, and narrowed, who is dis-
abled for purposes of the ADA, the focus of attention now is shifting to the
reasonable accommodation provision.""
"Adverse employment decisions3 2 include refusing to make reasonable
accommodations for (an employee)'s disabilities."" "The ADA specifi-
cally provides that an employer 'discriminates' against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability when the employer does not mak[e] reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of the individ-
ual unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the [em-
ployer]."3 4 The term 'reasonable accommodation' further "includes the
employer's reasonable efforts to assist the employee and to communicate
with the employee in good faith. . . under what has been termed a duty to
engage in the interactive process."
A "reasonable accommodation" may:
include making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, re-
assignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
30. Id.
31. Befort, supra note 15, at 933. It should be noted that "in disparate treatment cases, a simi-
larly-situated individual is treated differently because of his disability than less- or non-disabled individ-
uals. The key element is discriminatory intent. . . . As such, the McDonnell Douglas, three-step
approach is applied where no direct evidence of discrimination is available. . . . The failure to make
reasonable accommodations in the employment of a disabled employee is a separate form of prohibited
discrimination.... Reasonable accommodation claims are not evaluated under the McDonnell Doug-
las burden-shifting analysis." Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2003).
32. Approximately 2,995 of the 22,555 charges of retaliation filed in 2006 with the EEOC were
filed under non-Title VII causes of action. See The United States Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2007, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html (last modified Feb. 26, 2008). Retaliation as a cause of action is not discussed herein, but
must be recognized as another cause of action available to employees who also alleged disability dis-
crimination in employment. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee must show that
he or she engaged in a protected activity, that his or her employer took adverse action against him or
her, and that there existed a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 933 (2002). "The employer
then has the burden to rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a legitimate nonretaliatory
reason for its actions. . . . If the employer does so, the plaintiff [employee] must demonstrate that the
proffered reason is a pretext for forbidden retaliation. . . . The plaintiff [employee] always bears the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he or she was the victim of retaliation." Id. (citing
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 705-07 (4th Cir. 2001); Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d
614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997)).
33. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 761-62 (3d Cir. 2004).
34. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)).
35. Id. (quoting Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 416 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifi-
cations of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other sim-
ilar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.36
In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environment
or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a
disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.
As a general rule, "the individual with a disability (as he or she has the
most knowledge about the need for reasonable accommodation) must in-
form the employer that an accommodation is needed."3 ' An employer
may not assert that it never received a request for reasonable accommoda-
tion as a defense to a claim of failure to provide such accommodation, if it
actively discouraged an individual from making such a request.39
D. Who has the burden of proof?
"Under the ADA, the employer avoids all liability if the employee
would have been fired because he or she was incapable of performing the
essential functions of the job, and the burden of proof on the issue of capa-
bility is not on the employer, but on the plaintiff [employee]."4 0
To prevail on a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA,
. . . an aggrieved employee must establish that he has a disa-
bility as defined in 42 U.S.C. §12102(2); that he is qualified
to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodation; and that he has suffered ad-
verse employment action because of his disability. . . . The
employee at all times retains the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that he has been the victim of illegal discrimina-
tion due to his disability. . . . However, once the plaintiff
makes a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is
possible, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
show that it is unable to accommodate the employee.... If
the employer shows that the employee cannot perform the
essential functions of the job even with reasonable accom-
modation, the employee must rebut that showing with evi-
dence of his individual capabilities. . . . At that point, the
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2007).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2007).
38. The U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act: General Principles
(Oct., 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#requesting [hereinafter
Enforcement Guidance].
39. Id. at n.108.
40. Miller v. I. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Weiler v. Household Fin.
Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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employee's burden merges with his ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that he has suffered unlawful
discrimination.4 1
An employer generally bears no burden of production or proof if the
plaintiff-employee cannot establish that he or she is disabled.42
The approach of some courts suggests that the employee's burden of
proof is not a heavy one-it is enough for an employee to suggest the exis-
tence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not
exceed the benefits. 43 Once the employee has done this, he or she has
made a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation is available
and the risk of non-persuasion falls on the employer.4 4 With other courts,
the burden remains with the employee to prove his or her case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 45 Nonetheless, the employee still need only
make a general or facial showing of reasonableness.46
E. Who must request accommodation?
In general, it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to
inform an employer that an accommodation is needed. "Once a qualified
individual with a disability has requested a . .. reasonable accommodation,
the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate-
ness of the accommodation." 47
It is clear that "the EEOC has placed the initial burden of requesting
an accommodation on the employee . ... and [t]he employer is not required
to speculate as to the extent of the employee's disability or the employee's
need or desire for an accommodation." 48 Such was the case for an em-
ployee who had lifting restrictions that were accommodated by employer
until change in ownership of the business.4 9 The new employer advised the
employee that she would have to regularly lift 50+ pounds to which the
employee responded that she could not do.5 o One month after informing
41. Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995).
42. This test is not appropriate in every case, however. The test is inappropriate for cases in
which the employer acknowledges that it relied on employee's handicap in making its employment
decision. See, e.g., Monette v. Elec. Data Sys., Corp., 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
43. Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999).
44. Id.
45. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying parallel provisions of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973, which prohibits any federal agency from discriminating on the basis of disability
("handicap") and requires reasonable accommodation as required under the ADA). Since the ADA
expands the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act to the general economy, decisions interpreting that
Act are applicable to interpreting the ADA. See e.g., Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1994).
46. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.
47. Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§1630.9 (2007)).
48. Id. at 1046-47.
49. Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999).
50. Id. at 1362.
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her employer, the employee resigned without providing reason for resigna-
tion due ostensibly to the fact that she could not meet the new require-
ments.s1 The court found that the employee did not meet her burden, in
part, as proscribed in 29 C.F.R. §1630.9, by resigning without explanation
instead of requesting a reasonable accommodation. 5 2 The employee's fail-
ure to demand accommodation was fatal to her claim that her employer
"discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation."5 3
F. For what must an employee ask when requesting accommodation?
An "employee's request for an accommodation must be sufficiently
direct and specific, giving notice that (he or she) needs special accommoda-
tion."5 4 "[T]he request must explain how the accommodation requested is
linked to some disability.",5  "The employer has no duty to divine the need
for a special accommodation where the employee merely makes a mun-
dane request for a change at the workplace."56 Moreover, the ADA does
not require "the plaintiff [employee] to speak any magic words;" that is,
"the employee need not mention the ADA or even the term
'accommodation.' "15
Recently, the Sixth Circuit held that summary judgment was appropri-
ate for an employer when one of its former employees, as a matter of law,
"failed to demonstrate that he was qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of his Pharmacy Technician position" due to excessive absenteeism as
regular attendance was an essential function of his position." In Brenne-
man, the employee did not even mention his disability (i.e., diabetes) or
request any accommodation until after his termination of employment was
effectuated, even after the employee had prior instances of approved leave
due to his diabetic condition.
The Third Circuit employed similar reasoning in Conneen v. MBNA
America Bank.59 The employee, a marketing production manager, was
granted a temporary accommodation of one-hour delayed starting time due
to treatment for depression. 6 0 Despite numerous conversations with her
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1364.
53. Id.
54. Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Wayne v. Thfts
Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992)).
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 38 (an employee's request for new office chair
because the current one is uncomfortable does not provide sufficient notice that accommodation is
needed due to a disability).
57. Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994).
58. Brenneman v. Medcentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 420 (6th Cir. 2004) (the employee did
not timely notify his supervisors upon the final absence that prompted his termination of employment
and that the reason for such absence was due to his disability).
59. 334 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2002).
60. Id. at 321.
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employer, the employee continued to be tardy on a regular basis, both dur-
ing the time of the temporary accommodation and after.6 ' In addition, her
employer offered other accommodations (e.g., transfer to non-managerial
position), but she declined and maintained that there was nothing to pre-
vent her from working her normal schedule including her regular starting
time.6 2 Notwithstanding this representation, the employee's tardiness
problems continued and her employment was eventually terminated for ex-
cessive tardiness. The employee brought suit, in part alleging that her for-
mer employer had violated the ADA by withdrawing an accommodation
that it had previously granted to her (i.e., allowing her to report to work
one hour late).63 The court held that there was no ADA violation by the
employer because the employee did not engage in the interactive process in
good faith.6 4 Specifically, the court noted that (1) "she had previously re-
quested and was granted accommodation" so she was aware of what
needed to be done to request accommodation; (2) both the employee and
the employer acknowledged that the initial accommodation was temporary,
therefore, the employee knew that if her condition persisted, she would
have to provide her employer further documentation; and (3) the employee
actively misrepresented reasons for some tardiness, which included her ex-
planations for her tardiness as traffic tie-ups and cleaning up after a pet.6 5
G. When does an employer have knowledge of an employee's disability?
An employer has knowledge of an employee's disability when it is ad-
vised by the employee of the existence of the disability, or where it receives
the information from a third party including family member, physician, or
co-worker. The notice need not be specific nor must it contain any specific
request for an accommodation. It is enough to advise the employer that
the employee has some physical or mental condition that may interfere
with his or her employment. For example, where the employee's son ad-
vised the employer of his mother's hospitalization in a state psychiatric hos-
pital, the court held that sufficient notice was given to trigger the
interactive process and evaluation of the need for a reasonable
accommodation.6 6
In contrast, consider an employee who had complained for some time
that her position required two full-time employees and a student helper.6 7
The employee was subsequently treated for depression, but refused to sign
appropriate releases or provide information regarding the depression. 8
Her refusal to release information regarding the depression was held not to
61. Id. at 321-22.
62. Id. at 322.
63. Id. at 325.
64. Id. at 333.
65. Id. at 332-33.
66. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 314 (3d Cir. 1999).
67. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. Id. at 1132-33.
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trigger the interactive process or the evaluation of the need for a reasona-
ble accommodation (even though the employer had provided accommoda-
tions for the employee's other, disclosed, disabilities by lightening her
workload and making other adjustments to ease the known disabilities).69
H. What constitutes essential functions of a position?
The seven non-exclusive factors to weigh in determining if a function is
''essential" are:
(1) an employer's judgment that the function is essential;
(2) written job descriptions;
(3) the amount of time on the job devoted to performing
the function;
(4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to per-
form the function;
(5) terms in a relevant labor agreement;
(6) the work experience of those who have held the posi-
tion in the past; and
(7) the current work experience of those who hold similar
jobs.70
The inquiry into whether a function is essential is highly fact-specific.
In Brickers v. Cleveland Board of Education, a bus driver sought transfer to
a bus attendant position due to back and leg pain as bus attendants were
only employed on special education buses transporting handicapped stu-
dents.7 1 The court found that lifting was an essential function of a bus at-
tendant's job (even though the need to lift may occur only in the case of an
emergency such as an accident or fire).7 2 The employee also argued that
her employer was "required to offer some manner of accommodation,"
which was a bus route in which the likelihood that an occasion would arise
for her to actually have to lift a child is minimized." Such an argument was
not persuasive to the court, which stated that:
The ADA does not demand that an employer exempt a dis-
abled employee from an essential function of the job as an
accommodation. What (the employee) requests is not an
accommodation, but rather an exemption and, as such, does
69. Id. at 1136.
70. Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper, Inc., 14 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2000)).
71. 145 F.3d 846, 848 (6th Cir. 1998).
72. Id. at 849.
73. Id. at 850.
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not survive the threshold determination of whether she is a
'qualified individual with a disability.'"7
The Brickers court noted, "[a] legally-defined job qualification is by its
very nature an essential function under 42 U.S.C. §12111(8),71 [regardless]
of whether the employer adheres to that requirement in all cases." 76 Addi-
tionally, the EEOC admits that an employer may be required to alter when
and/or how an essential function is to be performed.
I. Must an employer create a new position or restructure a job?
It is well-settled that an employer is not required to create a new posi-
tion or reallocate an essential function. The Tenth Circuit recognized this
concept in holding that the ADA does not require an employer to "create a
new position to accommodate the disabled worker."79
Reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant-employer on procedural grounds, the Eighth Circuit in Ben-
son v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., specifically noted that an employer is not
required to restructure the essential functions of a job as a reasonable ac-
commodation under the ADA.so In Benson, the employee was a mechanic
working in the cargo bay of an aircraft when he suffered a relapse of brach-
ial plexopathy, a rare neurological condition that caused severe pain in his
left arm and shoulder." After a period of hospitalization, the employee
returned to work in the employer's recycling unit, where employees with
work-related injuries were temporarily assigned until they could either re-
turn to their former positions or find alternate jobs within the company.82
The employee's doctor advised the employer, in writing, that the employee
never again should engage in work requiring extensive or repetitive use of
his left arm or shoulder." Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
the employee was bumped from the recycling position by a more senior
employee, and briefly became a plant maintenance mechanic until he was
74. Id.
75. As defined within 42 U.S.C. §12111(8), the term "'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of
this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job
are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job."
76. Id.; see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Failure to require performance
of essential functions in all cases does not entitle an ADA claimant to a similar extraordinary
accommodation.").
77. See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o) (2008).
78. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on ADA 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App'x 1630.2(o); reprinted in
EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 154, N:2091, §1630.2(o).
79. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995).
80. Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112.
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disqualified from that job due to his doctor's recommended limitations. 84
After unsuccessfully applying for a position as foreman in the recycling de-
partment, the employee was discharged. Conceding that the employee
had the skill, experience, education, and job-related requirements to hold
the position of mechanic, the trial court held that the employee had failed
to establish that he could perform that job with a reasonable accommoda-
tion, and that the employee's ability to work as a dispatcher or foreman did
not equate to being able to perform the essential functions of a mechanic.86
The trial court found that the employee had failed to establish, as a matter
of law, that he was a "qualified individual with a disability."" The Eighth
Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling, noting that the lower court had
improperly placed the entire burden of proof on the employee instead of
recognizing the requirement that once the employee had established his
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate the
reasons that no reasonable accommodation can be made. Specifically
noting that the employer was not required to eliminate an essential job
function under the ADA, the court nevertheless held that the lower court's
improper application of the burden of proof precluded the issue from ever
being addressed.8 9
A recent Sixth Circuit case involved an employee who was a finish
helper with eight specific jobs who, for a period of fifteen years, had asked
the employer to establish a rotation system whereby all finish helpers
would rotate through all eight jobs within that job classification.9 0 The em-
ployer never adopted his recommendation.9 The employee presented a
statement from his physician certifying his total incapacitation due to car-
pal tunnel syndrome in both hands. 92 The employee had surgery and took
a three-month leave of absence, after which he returned to work, and then,
subsequently, took another leave of absence ten months later for the same
medical condition. The employee again returned to work, this time with
permanent restrictions, and sought transfer to a "light-duty" job held by
another employee. 94 When his employer refused to remove the second em-
ployee from his job, the employee's employment ended." The court held
that the employee never requested the establishment of a rotation system
as an accommodation.9 6 While the employee's proposed job moves
84. Id.
85. Benson, 62 F.3d at 1110-11.
86. Id. at 1111.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1114.
89. Id.
90. Brown, 14 F. App'x at 484.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Brown, 14 F. App'x at 484.
94. Id. at 485.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 487.
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"[w]ould not have reassigned anyone out of the broad finish helper classifi-
cation, they would have significantly redistributed tasks among [the] work-
ers who held different jobs," which the court thought was unreasonable.97
J. Is an employer required to provide assistance from others?
Job restructuring is a requirement of the employer under ADA man-
dates in certain circumstances." However, job restructuring only pertains
to the restructuring of non-essential duties of a position. 99 The ADA does
not require employers to accommodate individuals by shifting an essential
job function onto other workers.100
In Bratten, the employee contending disability discrimination was an
auto mechanic who sustained a work-related injury that left him with per-
manent limited use of his back, arms, and shoulders.10 1 The injury necessi-
tated a leave of absence as his work required constant use of hand tools,
power tools, and hand-intensive work on a repetitive basis.'02 After his
return to work from the leave, of absence, the employee admitted that he
could not perform 20% of his work because his disability prevented him
from doing overhead work.103 The employee requested that a co-worker
come to his work station and perform overhead work for him on an ad hoc
basis.10 4 When the employee provided his employer with a letter from his
doctor imposing restrictions on his ability to work, the employer placed
him on medical leave of absence pending a review by the employer's physi-
cian who found that employee's condition would not improve. 0 5 As a re-
sult, the employer filled the employee's position through its internal job-
posting program.106 The Sixth Circuit noted that courts have continually
held that "[e]mployers are not required to assign existing employees or hire
97. Id. at 488; see also Bratten v. SSI Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1999). While
discussed in more detail infra as to assistance from other employees as a form of reasonable accommo-
dation, the Bratten court held that job restructuring was a reasonable accommodation only when the
restructuring involves non-essential or marginal functions of the job.
98. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2008) ("Reasonable accommodation may include ... : Job re-
structuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or
modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, train-
ing materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommo-
dations for individuals with disabilities.").
99. Benson, 62 F.3d at 1112-13; see also Henchey v. Town of N. Greenbush, 831 F. Supp. 960, 967
(N.D.N.Y. 1993).
100. Bratten, 185 F.3d at 633.
101. Id. at 627-28.
102. Id. at 629.
103. Id. at 629. It is interesting to note that his employer contended that the employee could not
perform 40-50% of his work, but the court commented that it was "not concerned with the quantity of
the tasks at issue, but rather whether the duties constitute essential functions of the position." Id. at
633n.2.
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new employees to perform certain functions or duties of a disabled em-
ployee's job that the employee cannot perform . . . [because] of his
disability."' 0
K. Must an employer utilize temporary positions?
The ADA does not compel an employer to change temporary posi-
tions it has earmarked for another purpose (e.g., issues related to workers
compensation) into permanent positions for its disabled employees. As the
Dalton court explained, "to hold otherwise would be to require [the em-
ployer] to create new full-time positions to accommodate its disabled em-
ployees, a course of action not required under the ADA."os
The Seventh Circuit has held that assignment to a temporary position
may act as a reasonable accommodation only where both the employer and
the employee are aware that the position is temporary.1 09 In Bever, the
employee was a long-time assembler who had a leg amputated due to can-
cer and later the employee received a prosthetic limb.110 The employee's
job had two main components: (1) a physically-strenuous element, and (2)
a more passive element involving running a machine.' 1 When the em-
ployee returned to work with his prosthetic leg, an external rehabilitation
agency determined that the employee could not perform the more physi-
cally-strenuous element of the assembler job, but he was capable of safely
running the machine, which the employee did for a over a year.1 12 Subse-
quently, the employer determined that since the employee could not per-
form both elements of the assembler job, he should be terminated.113 At
trial, a jury determined that the employee's termination was in violation of
the ADA since he had been performing the essential functions of the as-
sembler's job after the job was restructured to only involve the operation
of the machine.11 4 The jury determined, and the Seventh Circuit agreed,
that since there was no clear indication that the restructure was temporary,
the employer could not later claim that the reassignment was only tempo-
rary, and the employee was still required to perform all the essential func-
tions of the assembler job. 1 '
107. Id. at 632; see, e.g., Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1996) ("to be
protected under the ADA, [the employee] must be qualified to do the job and, with reasonable accom-
modations for his disability, be able to perform the essential functions ofthatjob ... [which he currently
holds.]") (emphasis added). The Cochrum court noted that a co-worker's performance of overhead
work for the employee would essentially amount to the helper de facto performing the employee's job.
108. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1997).
109. Bever v. Titan Wheel Int'l, 6 F. App'x 401 (7th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). See also discussion
of the interactive process, infra at page 29.




114. Bever, 6 F. Appx at 402.
115. Id. at 406.
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L. Must the employer permit working from home
as a reasonable accommodation?
Allowing an employee to work at home, which may be referred to as
telework or telecommuting, may be a "reasonable accommodation where
an employee's disability prevents him or her from successfully performing
the job on-site, and the job (or parts of the job) can be performed at home
without causing significant difficulty or expense."11 6 According to the
EEOC,
An employer and employee first need to identify and review
all of the essential job functions (i.e., those tasks that are
fundamental to performing a specific job). An employer
does not have to remove any essential job duties to permit
an employee to work at home. However, it may need to
reassign some minor job duties or marginal functions if they
cannot be performed outside the workplace and they are
the only obstacle to permitting an employee to work at
home. After determining what functions are essential, the
employer and the individual with a disability should deter-
mine whether some or all of the functions can be performed
at home. For some jobs, the essential duties can only be
performed in the workplace. For example, food servers,
cashiers, and truck drivers cannot perform their essential
duties from home. But, in many other jobs some or all of
the duties can be performed at home. Several factors
should be considered in determining the feasibility of work-
ing at home, including the employer's ability to supervise
the employee adequately, and whether any duties require
use of certain equipment or tools that cannot be replicated
at home. Other critical considerations include whether
there is a need for face-to-face interaction and coordination
of work with other employees; whether in-person interac-
tion with outside colleagues, clients, or customers is neces-
sary; and whether the position in question requires the
employee to have immediate access to documents or other
information located only in the workplace. An employer
should not, however, deny a request to work at home as a
reasonable accommodation solely because a job involves
some contact and coordination with other employees. Fre-
quently, meetings can be conducted effectively by telephone
and information can be exchanged quickly through e-
mail. 17
116. See The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, Work at Home/Telework as a Reason-
able Accomodation, available at www.eeoc.gov/facts/telework.html (last modified Oct. 27, 2005).
117. Id. at Question 4.
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Courts have taken differing approaches toward working at home as an
accommodation. The Seventh Circuit has found that an employer is not
required to allow disabled workers to work at home except in extraordi-
nary circumstances while the District of Columbia Circuit (with subsequent
approval by the Ninth Circuit) has held that an employer must consider
requested accommodation of working at home."18
In Smith v. Ameritech, the Sixth Circuit held that an employer is not
required to permit an employee to work at home as an accommodation
because the employee's productivity is inevitably reduced." 9 In Smith, an
employee who worked as an advertising sales representative injured his
back in a car accident while working.12 0 Despite the injury, the employee
worked for eighteen months until he took a disability leave of absence.12 '
At issue was the employee's contesting of the termination of his short-term
disability benefits as well as an ADA violation for his employer's alleged
failure to accommodate.122 The employee was no longer able to lift yellow
page books and his employer had unsuccessfully tried to find alternate
work within his request for sedentary employment and other physical re-
strictions. 123 The employee argued that his employer could have reas-
signed him to a collections agent position, and he could be allowed to work
from home as the company did with another employee who had multiple
sclerosis. 24 The court held that the employee, in effect, was asking for two
accommodations, a transfer to a new position and the ability to work from
home, and that he failed to show that either was reasonable in this case. 25
The court reiterated certain principles including:
(1) an employer is not required to create a new position for
the disabled employee who can no longer perform the es-
sential functions of his or her job;
(2) the ADA does not require employer to reassign an em-
ployee to a position that was not vacant; and
(3) the ADA does not require that employer allow disabled
workers to work at home when their productivity is inevita-
bly reduced. 26
118. Compare Vande Zande 44 F.3d at 544-45, with Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 959 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (cited with approval in Buckingham v. United States, 998
F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993).
119. 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 860.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 862.
123. Id. at 866.
124. Smith, 129 F.3d at 866.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 867 (quoting Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545); see also Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Centers, Inc.,
31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Winbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd,
831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987) ("except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all
work-related duties at home, an employee who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job
functions, essential or otherwise.")).
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M. Is an employer that provides an accommodation not required by the
ADA to one employee consequentially obligated to provide the
same accommodation to other disabled employees?
In referencing a 1998 decision of the United States Supreme Court, the
Sixth Circuit held that provision of an accommodation to one disabled em-
ployee does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to the same accommoda-
tion.'27 In this decision, the Sixth Circuit also noted a similar
pronouncement by the Fourth Circuit in Myers v. Hose when it held that
"the fact that certain accommodations may have been offered . . . to some
employees as a matter of good faith does not mean that they must be ex-
tended to [plaintiff] as a matter of law."' 28
N. Must an employer reassign the employee to a vacant position?129
Reassignment accommodation has proven to be one of the most diffi-
cult and controversial of all accommodation issues. 3 o If an otherwise dis-
abled person can perform to the employer's satisfaction with a reasonable
accommodation provided for his or her disability, the employer is required
to provide the accommodation.131 One form of the required accommoda-
tion under this standard is reassignment to a vacant position.132 Reassign-
ment has been described as the "reasonable accommodation of last
resort."' 3 3 The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance "provides that reassign-
ment is required only after it has been determined that":
(1) there is no effective accommodation that will enable the
employee to perform the essential functions of his/her cur-
rent position; and
(2) all other reasonable accommodation would impose un-
due hardship.'34
In its decision in Gile, the Seventh Circuit referenced the Dalton court
in noting that "an employer is 'obligated to identify the full range of alter-
native positions for which the individual satisfies the employer's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory prerequisites' and consider 'transferring the employee
to any of these other jobs, including those that would represent a
demotion.'""
127. Smith, 129 F.3d at 867 (citing Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549 (1988) ("holding with
regard to ADA's counterpart for federal employers, that 'there is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that
requires any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons be extended to all categories of
handicapped persons.' ").
128. Smith, 129 F.3d at 867-68 (citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995)).
129. See Befort, supra note 15, at 942 (stating that reassignment as a reasonable accommodation is
required only for current employees, not applicants).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000).
132. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(B) (2006); see also, e.g., Dalton, 141 F.3d at 680.
133. See Befort, supra note 15, at 942.
134. Id.
135. Gile, 213 F.3d at 374 (citing Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678).
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Additionally, employers should reassign an employee to a position if it
becomes vacant within a reasonable amount of time.136 The determination
of what comprises a "reasonable amount of time" is to be made on a case-
by-case basis and is to "be determined in light of the totality of the circum-
stances."' 3 7 The Third Circuit recently recognized this proposition in con-
nection with a disability case brought by a bus driver who suffered from
transient ischemic attacks (TIA's), also known as mini-strokes.138
In Boykin, the bus driver requested an accommodation from his em-
ployer after the employer's physician revoked his medical certification as a
result of the employee suffering a TIA while driving a bus.'3 9 The state-
ment from the employer's physician mandated that the driver be TIA-free
for one year before being permitted to drive commercial vehicles.' 40 The
employer offered the driver the position of bus cleaner that was the only
open position at that time, but the employee refused and he was termi-
nated from employment.141 Six months later, the employer interviewed,
but did not hire, the employee for a new dispatcher position.142 The termi-
nated employee filed suit, contending that he should be entitled to the new
dispatcher position without requiring him to compete with other candi-
dates, but the court did not agree. 143 The court noted, as outlined in the
regulations, that "employers should reassign an employee to a position if it
becomes vacant within a reasonable period of time" and that the determi-
nation of reasonableness is to be made on a case-by-case basis. 44 The
court compared cases wherein thirty-seven days was held to be a reasona-
ble amount of time, but well over one year or even six months were unrea-
sonable periods of time.145 The court further noted that employers are not
136. Myers, 50 F.3d at 283. Myers is not without criticism, however, as to the issue of reassign-
ment to a vacant position. In Bratten, the Sixth Circuit noted that Myers relied on case law interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act before the statute was amended in 1992. See Bratten, 185 F.3d at 633. Prior to
1992, the Rehabilitation Act did not include reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accom-
modation. After the ADA was enacted, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to parallel the stan-
dards for employment discrimination under the ADA. See e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d
492 (7th Cir. 1996). The Bratten court therefore rejected employer's contention and held that reassign-
ment may be required to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability. Bratten, 185 F.3d at
635.
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2008).
138. Boykin v. ATC/Vancom of Colo., 247 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2001).
139. Id. at 1065.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1063.
143. Id. at 1065.
144. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1064-65; see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75
(10th Cir. 1999) (Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to a vacant
position for which the employee is qualified. A vacant position includes not only positions that are
vacant at a particular point in time, but also includes positions that the employer "reasonably antici-
pates will become vacant in the fairly immediate future.").
145. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065 (citing Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187 (a period of thirty-seven days has
been held to be a reasonable amount of time)); Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dep't, 227 F.3d
719, 729 (6th Cir. 2000) (unreasonable to require employer to assign employee to new position that
became available "well over a year" after employer became aware of disability); Kiphart v. Saturn
Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (as a matter of law, the 1,300 days employer sought
new position was "well in excess of the reasonable amount of time required by the ADA"); Scheer v.
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obligated to retain a disabled employee on unpaid leave indefinitely or for
an excessive amount of time.146 The EEOC suggests that six months is
beyond a "reasonable amount of time."1 4 7
Within one year of Boykin, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of assignment as a reasonable accommodation. 148 At issue
was an employee, a cargo handler for the airline-employer, who had in-
jured his back, resulting in his transfer to a less physically demanding
mailroom position. 14 9 Later, consistent with long-standing policy of the
employer, his new position became open to a seniority-based bidding pro-
gram under the airline's well-established seniority system.15 o When other
non-disabled employees planned to bid under this program, the employee
requested that the airline allow him to remain in the mailroom position,
notwithstanding the seniority program, as an accommodation to his disabil-
ity.15' The airline refused and, when a more senior employee was trans-
ferred to the mailroom, the employee lost his job.1 52
The question presented to the Court was whether the "ADA requires
an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a 'reasonable
accommodation' even though another employee is entitled to hold the po-
sition under the employer's bona fide and established seniority system." 53
The Court held that an employer is not required to accommodate an em-
ployee by reassigning him or her to another job if it conflicts with seniority
provisions unless there is "more" (i.e., "the plaintiff [employee] must pre-
sent evidence of that 'more,' namely special circumstances surrounding the
particular case that demonstrate the assignment is nonetheless
reasonable"). 154
0. Does the ADA require promotion or special training
to disabled employees?
The ADA "does not require employers to offer special training to dis-
abled employees."1 5 The Seventh Circuit was asked to consider this issue
when an employee was no longer able to perform her job as a door-to-door
insurance sales employee.156 She wanted her employer to train her so that
City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F. Supp. 1496, 1501-02 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (request that position be kept open
indefinitely until plaintiff had been seizure-free for six months was not reasonable accommodation).
146. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065 (Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999)
(Keeping a plaintiff on indefinite leave is unreasonable where he had informed employer he "could not
advise when and under what conditions he could return to any work.").
147. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 38, at Question 24, Example D (Oct. 2002).
148. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393-94 (2002).




153. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 395-96.
154. Id. at 406.
155. Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 2001).
156. Id. at 281.
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she could become qualified for promotion to the position of sales man-
ager.15 7 The court disagreed with the employee's request noting that:
the duty of reasonable accommodation may require the employer to
reconfigure the workplace to enable a disabled worker to cope with her
disability, but it does not require the employer to reconfigure the disabled
worker. A blind person cannot insist that her employer teach her Braille,
though she may be able to insist that her employer provide certain signage
in Braille to enable her to navigate the workplace.' 5 8
P. Is an employer required to provide an indefinite leave of absence?
The ADA does not require an employer to give an employee an indef-
inite leave of absence when the employee cannot provide the expected du-
ration of her impairment."5 ' The Tenth Circuit has agreed, holding that the
determination of exactly how long an employer should retain an employee
on indefinite or medical leave pending the availability of a position that
would accommodate the employee's disability, or how long after termina-
tion an employee should continue to be entitled to immediate placement
when a position he can fill becomes vacant, must be made on a case-by-case
basis.160
Q. Must the employer provide the accommodation
requested by the employee?
In determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, the em-
ployer must consider:
(1) the particular job involved, its purpose, and its essential
functions;
(2) the employee's limitations and how those limitations
can be overcome;
(3) the effectiveness an accommodation would have in ena-
bling the individual to perform the job; and
(4) the preference of the employee.161
An employer is not required to give employee the reassignment of his
or her choice. Rather, "the goal is to identify an accommodation that al-
lows the employee to perform the job effectively, not to provide the job of
the employee's choice." 162
Additionally, a disabled employee is "not required to accept an ac-
commodation," but if he or she chooses to reject the accommodation and
157. Id.
158. Id. at 282-83.
159. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065.
160. Id.; see also Monette, 90 F.3d at 1188.
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a), app. (2008).
162. Connolly v. Entex Info. Services, Inc., 27 F. App'x 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2001).
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he or she "cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform the essential func-
tions of the position, the individual will not be considered a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability."16 3
Consider the case of a police officer who was injured while appre-
hending criminals.' 6 4 He had a number of absences because of his injuries
(i.e., between 17 and 26 days of absence per year).16 5 He and his employer
disagreed as to whether he could use his injury leave for his absences or
whether he had to first exhaust his sick leave.16 6 Following a union griev-
ance over this issue, including alleged deterioration in his working relation-
ships with his supervisors, the employee retired in exchange for a $4600
settlement, the approximate value of the restoration of his sick leave.167
The employee and his health care provider stated that he was permanently
and partially disabled, and the employee sought and received disability
benefits.16 8 The employee then filed suit claiming, inter alia, that his al-
leged forced retirement amounted to a constructive discharge.169 He also
claimed that he was harassed because of his disability and disability-related
absences from work.170 The employee further claimed that his employer
refused to accommodate him by not letting him work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m. shift and by not transferring him to a detective position, as he claimed
that both alternatives were less stressful.' 7 ' His employer had offered for
the employee to work the desk job within the department (i.e., less stress
and no effect on seniority, pay, or benefits). 72 The employee did not want
the desk job because he said it was used as punishment, was less prestigi-
ous, and had diminished material responsibilities.173 Instead, he wanted to
be a police officer on the outside, not on the inside.174 His supervisor felt
that the employee was looking for a position where he did not have to
come to work every day.'7 s The district court found that the employer's
offer of desk job was a reasonable accommodation noting that:
[i]t is well settled that an employee cannot make his em-
ployer provide a specific accommodation if another reason-
able accommodation is instead provided. [If an employee
rejects the offered reasonable accommodation] that is nec-
essary to enable the individual to perform the essential
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (2008).
164. Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 809 (6th Cir. 1998).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 810.
168. Id.




173. Id. at 812.
174. Keever, 145 F.3d at 811.
175. Id.
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functions of the position . .. the individual will not be con-
sidered a qualified individual with a disability.17 6
R. What is the interactive process and what does it require?
"'The ADA itself does not refer to the interactive process,' but does
require employers to 'make reasonable accommodations' under some cir-
cumstances for qualified individuals.""'
With respect to what constitutes reasonable accommodation
the EEOC regulations indicate that it may be necessary [for
the employer] to initiate an informal interactive process
with [the employee]. This process should identify the pre-
cise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations."
The employer and the employee both have a duty to assist in the
search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good
faith.179 The Third Circuit has recognized that:
the interactive process does not dictate that any particular
concession must be made by the employer; nor does the
process remove the employee's burden of showing that a
particular accommodation rejected by the employer would
have made the employee qualified to perform the job's es-
sential functions . . . [a]ll the interactive process requires is
that employers make a good-faith effort to seek
accommodations.1 8 0
In other words, because "employers have a duty to help the disabled
employee devise accommodations, an employer who acts in bad faith in the
interactive process will be liable if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the employee would have been able to perform the job with accommoda-
tions."' The interactive process "may not be necessary if it is clear to
176. Id. at 812 (citing Hankins v. The Gap, 84 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1996)). In Hankins, a ware-
house employee suffered from stress-related migraine headaches and requested to be moved to a less
stressful area of the warehouse. Hankins, 84 F.3d at 799. Instead of transferring her, the employer
found that the employee was more adequately accommodated by the employer's medical and leave
policies. Id. Eventually, the employee was terminated and she sued claiming her employer had not
reasonably accommodated her disability. Id. at 799-800. The court held that the employer had made a
reasonable accommodation and even if the employee's accommodation request was also reasonable,
the employer had the discretion to choose which accommodation to provide. Id. at 797.
177. Williams, 380 F.3d at 771 (citing Shapiro v. Township of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.
2002)).
178. Id. at 771 (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) (2008)).
179. Id. (citing Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Barnett v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
180. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317.
181. Id. at 317-18.
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both parties involved what accommodation will work . . . because some-
times the accommodation is obvious" (e.g., an employee confined to a
wheelchair whose desk needs to be elevated with blocks so that her wheel-
chair will slide under it) and on other occasions, the accommodation is
impossible.' 82
An employee can demonstrate that his or her employer breached its
duty to provide reasonable accommodation because it failed to act in good
faith in the interactive process by showing:
(1) the employer knew about the employee's disability;
(2) the employee requested accommodation or assistance
for his or her disability;
(3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist
the employee in
seeking accommodations; and
(4) the employee could have been reasonably accommo-
dated but for the employer's lack of good faith.'8 3
But, the employee must show that a reasonable accommodation was
possible.1 8 4
In Williams, the employee was a police officer who was treated for
psychological conditions including depression. 18 The employee requested
assignment to the training unit or radio room as accommodation for his
restricted duty release, but his employer instead offered him an extended
unpaid leave of absence.186 The court found that the employee could have
been accommodated with the training unit or radio room assignment but
for the employer's failure to engage in good faith in the interactive pro-
cess. 1 8  Good faith may be demonstrated by meeting with the employee,
obtaining information about the disability and/or condition, obtaining input
from the employee as to particular wants and/or needs, at least considering
the employee's requests, and providing other choices (particularly if the
employee's ideas may prove to be too burdensome to the employer).8 8
The Sixth Circuit decided a case wherein upon an employee's return
from the latest of a series of medical leaves of absence, the only request she
presented was for her employer to furnish her with a conveyor to assist
182. Id. at 319.
183. Williams, 380 F.3d at 772 (citing Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319-20); see also Montoya v. State of
N.M., 2000 WL 216593, *3. (unpublished opinion)).
184. Id. (citing Donahue v. CONRAIL, 224 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Taylor, 184 F.3d
at 319-20.
185. Williams, 380 F.3d at 756.
186. Id. at 757-58.
187. Id. at 776.
188. Id. at 772.
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with her work.18 9 Her employer complied with her request.190 The em-
ployee then subsequently applied for and was granted disability retire-
ment.1'9 Nearly two years after the employee left employment of the
employer, she filed suit alleging disability discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation, claiming in part that her employer failed to accommodate her
by not transferring her to a light-duty position, an accommodation that she
had never requested. 19 2 The court found that the employee, therefore,
failed the second of the four-prong test enumerated in Taylor (i.e., "the
employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disabil-
ity") as her only request to her employer, the conveyor, was
accommodated.193
The Ninth Circuit also recently considered an employee's contention
that she was not reasonably accommodated by her employer, but ulti-
mately found that the employer did not have any affirmative obligation to
provide an accommodation when none was ever requested.194 The em-
ployee was arrested for drunk driving as well as being in possession of and
under the influence of illegal drugs.195 She was incarcerated and required
to attend round-the-clock rehabilitation.196 As a result, she missed work.' 9 7
Her employer terminated her employment for "improper conduct" (pursu-
ant to terms of a collective bargaining agreement), and absence for three
consecutive shifts without an authorized reason (consistent with company
policy).198 The court noted that the employee fell out of the safe harbor
provision of the ADA as she had so recently used drugs and alcohol, and
found that "employers are entitled to seek reasonable assurances that no
illegal use of drugs is occurring or has occurred recently enough so that
continuing use is a real and ongoing problem."19 9 Since the employee
never requested an accommodation, either while working or when arrested
and placed in rehab, the court found the employer was not under any af-
firmative obligation to provide an accommodation.20 0
Additionally, the Brown court noted that the interactive process for
finding a reasonable accommodation may be triggered by the employer's
recognition of the need for such an accommodation, even if the employee
189. Clark v. Whirlpool Corp., 109 F. App'x 750, 754 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). While Clark
involved issues of harassment and retaliation under an Ohio statute, that statute was a parallel of the
ADA and the court applied ADA interpretations.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 751.
192. Id. at 752-53.
193. Id. at 755-56.
194. Brown v. Lucky Stores, 246 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001).




199. Id. at 1188 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-596, at 64 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 573. See also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 857 (5th Cir.
1999); Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1997).
200. Brown, 246 F.3d at1189.
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does not specifically make the request.201 The usual requirement that an
employee must initially request accommodation does not apply when the
employer:
(1) knows that the employee has a disability,
(2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is ex-
periencing workplace problems because of the disability,
and
(3) knows, or has reason to know, that the disability pre-
vents the employee from requesting a reasonable
accommodation.202
"The employer is required to initiate the interactive process only when
'an employee is unable to make such a request' and the company knows of
the existence of the employee's disability." 2 03 In Brown, the court found
that the employee was not unable to make such a request nor did her em-
ployer know or have reason to know that she had a disability that pre-
cluded her from making such a request.204
A party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in
good faith. A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or re-
sponse, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, courts should attempt
to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then assign responsibility. For
example, the cause of the breakdown might be missing information.2 0 5
As previously discussed, the employee alleging disability discrimina-
tion in Beck was a secretary in an academic unit and had been on three
different medical leaves of absence.2 0 6 When she returned from the first
leave, her employer assigned her to a different unit with a different wor-
kload and requested equipment.2 0 7 When she returned from her second
leave, the employer asked her to sign a release so that her physician could
provide more information to the employer's physician.20 8 She failed to sign
the requested release.2 09 When she returned from her second leave, the
employee failed to respond to her employer's request for more information
so that it could know how to respond to her disability.2 1 0 The court ruled in
the employer's favor, noting that when an "employer does not obstruct the
[reasonable accommodation] process, but instead makes reasonable efforts
to communicate with the employee and provide accommodations based on




205. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135.
206. Id. at 1132-33.
207. Id. at 1132.
208. Id. at 1133.
209. Id.
210. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1133
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information that it possesse[s]," the employer should not be liable for disa-
bility discrimination.2 1' The court explained that when missing information
about an employee's medical condition might not always indicate that the
employee is responsible for failing to specify a necessary accommodation,
but in a case such as this one (i.e., where the employer has made many
attempts to acquire the needed information), it is the employee who ap-
pears not to have made reasonable efforts.2 12 Conversely, the Beck court
noted that if employer's unwillingness to engage in such a process leads to
a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee, the employer might be
liable under the ADA.213
An employer can be assured that it will not be punished for "engaging
in frank discussions with employee[s] about the nature of what is being
offered to him [or her], as required by the ADA." 2 14 Once an employee
has informed the employer of his or her disability and requested accommo-
dation, the ADA obligates the employer to engage with its employee in an
interactive process to determine the appropriateness of the accommodation
under the circumstances.2 15
S. Is an employer required to retain and accommodate a
potentially violent employee?
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that the ADA:
does not require an employer to retain a potentially violent
employee.... [because to do so] would place the employer
on a razor's edge - in jeopardy of violating the [ADA] if it
fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of being deemed
negligent if . .. [the employer] retain[s] [the employee] and
he [or she] then hurt someone.216
In Palmer, an employee directly threatened a co-worker by, among
other things, telling the co-worker that she was "ready to kill her."217 The
court recognized that the employee was terminated for threatening to kill
another employee, not due to her disability (i.e., depression and paranoia).
In an interesting analogy of the case at bar to a scene from Hamlet, the
211. Id. at 1137.
212. Id. (citing Carrozza v. Howard County, MD, 45 F.3d 425, 1995 WL 8033 (4th Cir. 1995)
(summary judgment in favor of the employer appropriate where the employee suffering from manic
depression failed to articulate any reasonable accommodation). The Carrozza court noted that an "em-
ployer [is] not required to provide a 'stress-free environment' or immunize employee from legitimate
job-related criticism." Carrozza, 45 F.3d 425, 1995 WL 8033 at *3 (citing Pesterfield v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 1991)).
213. Id. at 1137.
214. See, e.g., Bever, 6 F. App'x at *2 (citing Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc. 92 F.3d 560
(7th Cir. 1996)).
215. Bombard, 92 F.3d at 563.
216. Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997).
217. Id.
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court noted that if an employer fires an employee because of the em-
ployee's unacceptable behavior, the fact that the behavior was precipitated
by mental illness does not present an actionable ADA issue.218 In other
words, a reasonable accommodation inquiry is not required if an employee
commits or threatens to commit violent acts. The ADA "protects only
'qualified' employees, that is, employees qualified to do the job for which
they were hired; threatening other employees disqualifies one. "219
T. What constitutes an undue hardship?2 20
In general, the term "undue hardship" means an action requiring sig-
nificant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors such
as:
(1) the nature and net cost of the accommodation needed
under this part, taking into consideration the availability of
tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding;
(2) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation,
the number of persons employed at such facility, and the
effect on expenses and resources;
(3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity, the
overall size of the business of the covered entity with re-
spect to the number of its employees, and the number, type
and location of its facilities;
(4) the type of operation or operations of the covered en-
tity, including the composition, structure and functions of
the workforce of such entity, and the geographic separate-
ness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility
or facilities in question to the covered entity; and
(5) the impact of the accommodation upon the operation of
the facility, including the impact on the ability of other em-
ployees to perform their duties and the impact on the facil-
ity's ability to conduct business.221
The EEOC suggests that if an employer determines that providing a
particular accommodation results in undue hardship, the employer should




220. A detailed discussion of what constitutes an "undue hardship" is beyond the scope of this
article and is reserved for discussion in a future article.
221. 42 U.S.C. §12111(10) (2006); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(p) (2008).
222. A Primer for Small Business, supra note 2.
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III. CONCLUSION
As indicated at the outset, the ADA requirement that employers pro-
vide reasonable accommodations to otherwise qualified individuals with a
disability would appear to be a fairly simple matter. However, issues such
as when an accommodation must be considered, how the parties determine
what accommodation would be appropriate, who gets to determine which
accommodation is reasonable, and even what "reasonable" means, often
raise many more questions than would appear to be appropriate or
expected.
When considering the language of the ADA and how courts have ap-
plied it in the workplace, much remains unclear. What is clear, however, is
that the ADA, at minimum, should trigger substantial and thoughtful con-
sideration of a variety of factors in evaluating the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" requirement. Thus, employers need to provide considered analysis
before reaching the conclusion that the issue has been adequately ad-
dressed. Quite often, more questions remain.
